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A classical situation involving disagreement between two parties is "King
Solomon's Dilemma". The nature ofSolomon's dilemma begins w~ith a dispute
between two women in which each claims to be the mother ofa certain child. Of
course, Solomon wishes to give the child to the rightful mother at no cost to her.
The difficulty is that although Solomon knou s that one ofthem is the mother, he
does not know which one.
In one of the most convincing recent applications ofthe theory of
implementation, Glazer and Ma (1989) provide a strikingly simple and elegant
solution to Solomon's dilemma for the case in which it is commonly known among
all three parties that the rightful mother values possession ofthe child at a dollars,
and the impostor values possession of the child at b dollars, where a~b. Moore
(1992) modified the Glazer-Ma mechanism to nicely accommodate the more
general case in which it is cottvnonly known that only the women know the values
of a and b, while Solomon knows only that the true mother values possession of
the child strictly more than the impostor does Although slightly more complex
than Glazer and Ma's mechanism, Moore's remains remarkably simple given the
task at hand.
Our objective here is to complete the task of resolving Solomon's dilemma
by removing the remaining informational restriction while maintaining simplicity in
the implementing mechanism. We shall assume only that it is commonly known
both that the women know who the rightful mother is and that she values
possession of the child strictly more than does the impostor. It is shown that a
second-price sealed-bid aIl-pay auction with the winner having an ex-post option to
quit solves Kine Solomon's dilemma in iteratively undominated strategies Indeed,
four rounds ofelimination suffice.
The remaining two sections present the model and solution. For ease of
exposition, the formal details are kept to a minimum The interested reader may
wish to consult the appendix for a formal model ofknowledge.
2. The ~todel
There are two agents, A and Bt A single object is to be allocated at no
cost to the agent who values it most We maintain the following assumptions, each
of which is common knowledge between A and B(i) the agents' values are
positive and are distinct, (ii) each agent knows which of them has the higher value
and each agent knows his own value, (iii) neither agent rules out the true value of
the other agent, (iv) the low value agent places a finite upper bound on the other
agent's value~, and (v) each agent's payoff of obtaining the object at price p when
' For ease of e~position we describe the case imohing two agents. The mechanism works in the same
Na} Cor the n agent case when the identin of the agent hat ing the highest value is common
knowledge among the agents.
' One can dispense wlth this assumption b} modifiing the mechanism stightly.its value to that agent is v, is v-p, while the payoff associated with paying p and not
receiving the object is -p'.
The agents will participate in a second-price sealed-bid all-pay auction with
on optron. The option is that after the bids are revealed to the agents, the winner
(highest bidder) can either choose to stick with the auction (in which case he
receives the object and both bidders pay the second-highest bid), or he can choose
to quit and give the object to the other agent in which case no payments are made
by either agent. If the two bids are identical, then the object is sold to one ofthem
(determined by the toss of a fair coin) at a price equal to the common bid. In this
case the other agent pays nothing.
3. The Solution
W'e now show that this mechanism implements the desired outcome in
iteratively (weakly) undominated strategies.`'' Without loss of generality, we
assume that agent A values the object more than B. Throughout the analysis
below, p denotes a bid by A and q denotes a bid by B.
Round I For each agent, eliminate every strategy such that given the agent's value
and the bid then specified by the strategy, the strategy also specifies quitting
(buying the object) if the agent's bid is winning and the second highest bid is below
(above) his value.
Round 2 Eliminate all strategies for A in which he bids above his value, a. All
such bids are weakly dominated by bidding his value. To demonstrate this, we
consider below- all possible cases. It is useful to recall that by assumption
(') A knows that his own value, a, strictly exceeds B's value.
(a) q~p~a B wins the auction whether A bids p or a, and in both cases B exercises
the option to quit Hence, by (`), .4 knows this and so is indifferent between
bidding p and a.
(b) q-p~a By bidding p, agent A, with probability one-half, obtains the object for
a price of p~a. However, a bid equal to a would render B the winner. B would then
' Assumpuon (iii) might strike Ute reader as being cery strong. In our view this is not the case, For to
~iolate (iiil an agent must rule out the wth. But this is tantamount to drawing a definite conclusion
~~hen no such conclusion can possible be (definitiveh) draHn. In an} event, the present informatiottal
assumptions Ui)-(t~ ) are substantiall} ~~eaker than those in Gtazer and Ma (1989) and Moore (1991)
' A strateg} is a funcuon from an agent's ~alue to a non negative bid and a decision funcuoa The
decision funcuon pro~ides for each pair of bids in ~~hich the agent bid is ~iinning. a decision to either
qwt or not ~Ve define ~~eac dominance as follows. A strategc s for A weaklv dominares s' against a
subset, Y. of B's strategtes, if for every t in Y, e~ery aw, and every ~alue b~0 ofpla~er B that pta}er
A of value a cannot rule out. s(a) }ields at least az high a pa}ofT as s'(a) against t(b), and a stncth
higher pa}off for m least one such triple [, a,b.
' The full force of iteratice domin.~tnce is not needed here. Onlv four rounds of elimination are
required Earlier rounds ofelimination can be justified more easily than later ones since each round
c.~tn be jusufied onh ifthe players d the players know that the prewous eliminauons have been made.
Consequently, fe~ser rounds of elimination correspond to less stringent assumptions about the players'
mutua knowledge and therefore render the solution more compelling.take the option to quit giving A the object for free By (`), A knows this so that A
strictly prefers the bid a over p.
(c) p~q~a: If A bids p, then A wins the auction and takes the option to quit But if
A bids a, then B w.ins the auction and takes the option to quit. By (`) A knows this
so that bidding a is strictly better for A than is bidding p.
(d) p~a-q: IfA bids p, then A wins the auction and obtains a payoff ofzero
whether or not he chooses to quit. IfA bids a, then with probability one-halfhe is
the winner and again receives a payoff ofzero, and with probability one-halfB is
the winner in which case A neither pays any money nor receives the object. Hence,
A is indifferent between bidding a and p.
(e) p~a~q: A wins the auction whether he bids a or p. Hence A is indifferent
between bidding a and p
We conclude that it is weakly dominant for A to submit a bid less than or
equal to his value.
Round 3: Eliminate all remaining strategies for B except those in which he chooses
a bid that he knows is strictly above A's value. (Call such bids conservatrve ones
for B.) That B places some upper bound on A's value is guaranteed by assumption
(and this is common knowledge). In order to demonstrate that these strategies are
weakly dominated, we consider all possibilities.
(a) q~psa If B bids q, then A wins the auction and chooses to buy the object at
price q. B must then also pay q obtaining a non positive payoff If instead B bids
conservatively, then B is guaranteed to win the auction (since from Round 2 A's
bid is not above his value) and so is guaranteed a non negative payoff(he can
always subsequently choose the option to quit). Moreover, for values of p below
B's value ofthe object, B strictly prefers to bid conservatively since he will obtain a
strictly positive payoff by purchasing the object after winning the auction.
(b) q-p~a If B bids q, then with probability one-half B must buy the object at
price p. Bidding conservatively guarantees B the option of buying the object at
price p The latter is strictly better for B whenever p differs from B's value and
equally good otherwise.
(c) q-p-a If B bids q, then with probability one-half B must buy the object at price
p-a which is above his value, while a conservative bid guarantees B a non
negative payoff
(d) q~p, p5a: B wins the auction whether he bids conservatively or bids q Hence B
is indifferent between the t~vo.
We conclude that B submits a bid that he knows is strictly above A's value.
Round 4 Eliminate all remaininst strategies for A except those in which he
chooses a bid that he knows is above B's value (Call these bids conservative ones
for A In particular then, conservative bids for A do not exceed A's value since
such bids were eliminated in Round 2 Also, note that bidding his own value
constitutes a conservative bid for A.) The reason that these strategies are
dominated follows.
From Round 3, we have that B's bid exceeds A's value Since at this stage
A's bid does not exceed his own value, A knows that B will win the auction.Consequently, by choosing a conservative bid, A guarantees himself the object for
free, since A's conservative bid, being above B's value, is certain to induce B to
quit after B wins the auction. On the other hand, among those bids remaining (i.e.
those which do not exceed A's value) by choosing a non conservative one A runs
the risk that his bid is less than or equal to B's value and then that B chooses to
purchase the object. Agent A then would not obtain the object and would also pay
the amount of his bid.
We conclude that A submits a conservative bid (i.e. one that is not above
his own value and one that he knows is above B's value). Since at this point in the
elimination process B also submits a conservative bid (i e. one that he knows is
above A's value), and neither player rules out the truth, no further elimination is
possible. All remaining strategies yield the same outcome, namely that B wins the
auction and chooses to exercise the option to quit. Thus A receives the object and
neither agent makes any payment
Appendiz
In this appendix we provide a formal model of knowledge along the lines of
Aumann (1976).
Let f2 denote the set of states of the world and let IIA and IiB denote agent
A's and B's information partitions of S2 respectively. Let I7,(W) denote the element
of II; containig those states that i does not distinguish between (or rule out) when
the true state is ~, Also, let 4':S2~R'.. be a mapping taking states ofthe world
into a value of the object for each agent. We maintain the following assumption
for all w, wES2 and i- A, B:
l. (ilEÍÍ~((il)
2. If `Y(c~)- (x,a,xy) then
(a) x~xxB
(b) ~'En~(~)--~`Y~(~)-~~
(c) x.~~xa, w'Ell~ (u) and `I'(ca')-(x~.a,x'e)-i x'.~~x's
3- `E'(]ii(w) is bounded.
Assumptions 1-3 express, respectively that 1. neither agent tules out the
truth, 2(a) the agents' values are distinct, (b) each agent knows his own value, (c)
each agent knows whose value is larger; and 3 each agent places a finite upper
bound on the other 's value at each state ofthe world
A strategy for an agent is a fiinction from states ofthe world into a non
negative bid and a decision function. The decision function specifies for each pair
of bids in which the agent's bid is winning, a decision to either quit or not The
agent's strategy must be measurable with respect to his information partition.
iGiven strategies s and r for agents A and B respectively, let u(s(w), r(w)~w)
denote A's payofffrom the auction w~hen the state is wES2. Let s' be another
strategy for A and let Y be a subset of strategies for B Then we say that s weakly
domiiro[es s' for A against lr', if u(s(w),r(w)~w)?u(s'(w), r(w)~w) for all wES2 and
all rE Y, with at least one such pair w and r yielding a strict inequality. Weak
dominance is similarly defined for a-ent B.
With these definitions, the steps taken in the main text can be applied
equally well here and the result is the same. Our auction mechanism implements the
desired outcome in iteratively undominated strategies whenever the situation can
be modelled as above. w'e now give two such examples. The examples are also
meant to illustrate the permissivenecs of our informational assumptions.
Example 1(Glazer and i`1a (I9S~)) Fix x~y. Let S2-{(x,y), (y,x)} TIA-IiB-
{ {(x,y)},{(y,x)} } and `Y(w)-w fi~r all wES2.
Example 2(Moore (I991)) Let S?-;(a,b)eR~..~ axb}
II,~-Iia-{ { (a.b) } I(a.b)E S2 }.
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